University of Pennsylvania

Law Review
And American Law Register
FOUNDED 1852
Published Quarterly, November to June, by the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
at 34th and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.
$2.50 PER ANNUM ; FOREIGN, $3.00; SINGLE COPIES, 65 CENTS.
Board of Editors
PHILIP WALLIS
Editor-in-Chief
CHARLES I. THOMPSON
WILLIAM C. FERGUSON, Jr.
Case Editor
Book Review Editor
ARTEMAS C LESLIE
Business Manager
Associate Editors
GERALD F. FLOOD
GAMBLE LATROBE, Jr.
JOHN H. LUCAS
DAVID F. MAXWELL
WALTON 0. SCHALICK
SIGMUND H. STEINBERG
CLAUDE B. WAGONER
HARRIS C. ARNOLD
MEYER E. COOPER

CARL W. FUNK
MORTIMER E. GRAHAM
CHARLES F. KENWORTHEY
E. EVERETT MATHER, Jr.
BALDWIN S. MAULL
I. MORTON MEYERS
GEOFFREY S. SMITH
MAURICE STERN'
JOHN C. WRIGHT
Treasurer
B. M. SNOVER

NOTES.
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-In the recently decided Natural Gas Cases,' the United States Supreme Court
has again pronounced void an attempt by a State to discriminate
against interstate commerce in favor of domestic needs. The facts
'Commonwealth of Pcnnsylvania v. State of West Virginia, and State
of Ohio v. State of West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923).
The cases had been argued three times when that opinion was handed down,
but, because three members of the court had heard only the last presentation, a fourth argument was made on November 2o, 1923; and on December
3, 1Q23, the court reaffirmed its previous decree on the basis of its earlier
opinion. The cascs were Nos. 15 and 16, original, of October Term, 1922.
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which gave rise to this litigation were as follows: The production
of natural gas began in West Virginia about thirty years ago, in
connection with oil operations. At that time its amount was largely
in excess of the general demand for it within the State, and consequently the producers sought a market in neighboring States,
and particularly in Ohio and Pennsylvania. The State of West
Virginia encouraged these efforts, permitted the formation of pipe
line companies under her laws, and extended to them the power of
eminent domain. In view of the growing appreciation on the part
of consumers of the value of natural gas both for heating and lighting purposes, the demand increased in West Virginia and elsewhere, and a very large volume of business was done annually; of
this volume, the supply of gas to the penal, charitable, and other institutions supported by the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania constituted a very considerable part. The supply was adequate to the
demand.
Natural gas is contained in porous rock strata at great depths,
where it is under pressure. When a well is drilled down to the
proper depth, this pressure forces the gas out; after a large amount
of gas has been withdrawn, the pressure is decreased and the production is diminished. About the year 1916 it became .apparent
that the West Virginia gas field had passed its point of maximum
production; and during the winter months the supply became less
than the demand.
With the desire of making the resulting inadequacy fall on
users of the gas other than its own citizens, the Legislature of West
Virginia, on February IO, i919, passed an act,2 by which every person
engaged in furnishing natural gas for the use of the public within the
State was required, to the ektent of his supply, to furnish gas for all
purposes for which it was desired by the public within the State.
Further provisions gave the Public Service Commission of the State
Acts 19,9, c. 7. The first section of the act reads as follows:
"Section i. That every person engaged in furnishing, or required by
law (w1iether statutory or common law) to furnish, natural gas for public
use, or for the use of the public, or any part of the public, whether for
domestic, industrial or other consumption, within this state, shall to the
extent of his supply of said gas produced in this state (whether produced
by such person or by any other person), furnish for public use within the
territory of this state, and for the use of the public and every part of the
public within the territory of this state, in or from which such gas is produced, or through which such gas is transported, or which is served
by such person, a supply of natural gas reasonably adequate for the purposes, whether domestic, industrial or .otherwise, or which natural gas is
consumed or desired t&be consumed by the public, within said territory in
this state, and for which said consumer, or any part of the public, or consumers therein shall apply and be ready and willing to make payment at
lawful rates."
The. act is printed in full in the margin of the court's opinion, reported
in 43 Sup. Ct. 658, at 66o.
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power to enforce the proper distribution of gas under the act; and
penalties of fine and imprisonment were provided for breach of its
requirements.
The act went into effect on May Ii, i919.

Eight days later the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State of Ohio brought
original bills in the Supreme Court to enjoin the enforcement of the
act by the State of West Virginia, on the ground that it was in conflict with the commerce clause of Federal Constitution.3 The court
granted interlocutoiy injunctions; and, by its recent decision, has
made those injunctions permanent.
The opinion of the majority of the court places the decision on
the broad ground that a State law which discriminates against interstate commerce is void. "The purpose" of the commerce clause
"is to protect commercial intercourse from invidious restraints, to
prevent interference through conflicting or hostile State laws, and
to insure uniformity in regulation.

.

.

.

Natural gas is a lawful

article of commerce, and its transmission from one State to another
for sale and consumption in the latter is interstate commerce. A
State law, whether of the State where the gas is produced or that
where it is to be sold, which by its inecessary operation, prevents,
obstructs or burdens such transmission is a regulation of interstate
commerce-a prohibited interference. . . . The West Virginia
act is such a law."'
The decision thus reached, and the majority's process of reasoning is, it is submitted, clearly in conformity with the intent of
the framers and with the prior adjudications of the court. "It is
very probable that all that was in the minds of the framers of the
Constitution when they drafted the commerce clause was to give to
the national government power to prevent the States from interfering with the freedom of interstate and foreign commerce." 5 No
clearer case of such interference could possibly be found than the
present one.
In prior cases the court has uniformly held that interstate commerce should be free from similar discriminations. The case most
frequently cited in this connection is West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co.,8 in which very closely apalogous facts were present; but the
principal case is stronger in one respect. In the earlier case the
Kansas statute was aimed at foreign pipe line companies, and attempted to prevent their exporting natural gas from the State; but in
the principal case the power of the State to so discriminate against
interstate commerce is denied, even when attempted to be exerted
over public service corporations created and controlled by the same
Art. x, Sec. 8, clause 3.
'43 Sup. Ct. 658, 665 (1923).
'Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution (x922), 2o7.
'221

U. S. 229 (1910).
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State. The contention of the State of West Virginia, that the statute merely enunciated the existing duty of the domestic pipe line companies, to provide .first for domestic consumers, who had also been,
to a large extent, the first consumers to whom the companies had
become obligated to furnish gas, was an additional point in the principal case, which had not been presented by the facts of West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co.7 But the court disposed of the contention
by saying that the obligations to consumers in all the States, undertaken when there was no shortage of gas, were of equal force; and
that the statute was merely an improper attempt to subordinate the
interstate business to local needs.' It may therefore be said that
the principal case on its facts intrenches the rule against discrimination in a stronger position than that which it had previously held.
However, in many other cases the rule against discrimination
has been clearly stated by the court. The examples are to a large
extent in the field of State taxation of articles brought from other
States as such,' and the cases in which a State attempted to prevent
exportation of commodities to points beyond its borders, as in the
principal case, are rare, because States are generally more interested
in preventing competition by foreign products than in keeping their
own products to themselves.
Other cases, however, have been decided, which are, in a superficial view, close to the principal case, yet whose decisions were
contrary to its result. It is submitted that there is no conflict in
their principles, and that a proper appreciation of the facts of these
cases renders them distinguishable. Geer v. Connectictut" is frequently cited as a case where a State law which aimed at the prevention of interstate commerce, while permitting intrastate commerce, was upheld. But, as pointed out by the Supreme Court itself in another case,' game is not an ordinary part of commerce; it
is of a highly special nature, and the State's power to regulate its
incidents, arising from the State's qualified title as parens patrix,
is very extensive, if not .absolute. To deprive a landowner of the
right to take gas or oil from his land would be a taking of private
property which must be cOaiifisated; but "to deprive the same landowner of the right to reaude animals ferm uaturae to possession
would be entirely within the 'ower of the State without any duty
to make amends therefor..
'Note 6, upra.
"43 Sup. Ct.'158, 4665 (1923).
'Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (868); Welton v. Missouri, 9z U.
S. 275 (1875); Walling v. Michigan, 1i6 U. S. 446 (x885); Darnell and Son
v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113 (1907).
15161 U. S. 5i9 (1896).
'Ohio Oil Co.'v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 209 (1896).
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A somewhat more difficult case was presented where a State
statute prohibited the exportation of water beyond its boundaries.
This law was upheld,12 upon the same general grounds as in Geer v.
Connecticut ' 3-that water was a substance which was subject to
extensive control by the State, and that the rights of an individual
to use water were qualified and imited by this power of the State
to control the subject. The case, however, while thus distinguishable, comes near to the principal case; and, it is submitted,, is supported only by the well-recognized qualifications of riparian rights
in favor of other riparian owners, which seem to give to water a
nature different from that of ordinary commercial articles.
Justice Holmes dissented " in the principal case, and expressed
the view that the statute should not be held unconstitutional under
the commerce clause. His reasoning is that the obligation imposed
by the statute upon producers of gas attaches before the gas has
begun to move in interstate commerce. "The products of a State
until they are actually started to a point outside it may be regulated
by the State notwithstanding the commerce clause.

.

.

.

I see

nothing in the commerce clause to prevent a State from giving a
preference to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its natural advantages."
Taking the view (which seems a very reasonable one) that
the gas which is the subject-matter covered by the statute, is not
yet a part of interstate commerce,' 5 it is submitted that both the
"Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 2o9 U. S. 349 (19o8).
A number of other cases which are frequently cited on the question
of discrimination are not in point; in them the pr'oblem was whether a
burden imposed upon all articles was invalid because an unreasonable burden
upon interstate commerce, but no discrimination between interstate and intrastate commerce existed. Plumley v. Mass., 155 U. S. 461 (i94); Shollenberg v. Pa., 171 U. S. I (1898); Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S.
enberger v. Pa., 171 U. S. I (1898); Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S.

3o (1899); Crossman v. Lurman, i92 U. S. i89 (i9o3); Savage v. Jones,
U. S. 501 (1911); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1915).
' Note io, supra.

225

3'43 Sup. Ct. 6_8, 666.
Mr. Justice McReynolds also dissented, on the
ground that no justiciable controversy was presented. 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 667.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in a separate opinion dissented on the same ground,
expressing, however, his agreement with the view taken by Mr. Justice
Holmes of the merits of the case. 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 668.
'In the recent case of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245
(1922), a Pennsylvania statute imposing a tax on anthracite coal ready for
shipment was upheld, although So per cent. of the coal was intended for
shipment out of the state. The court held that the coal was not yet in
interstate commerie" and that it was taxable by the state as part of the
general mass of property in the state. The case is distinguishable from the
principal case, because there was no discrimination against interstate commerce; coal intended for domestic use and coal intended for shipment to
other states were taxed equally. The interesting problem as to whether a
state which possesses a monopoly of a certain article can entirely prevent its
production is not presented in either case. Under Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., a tax imposed by West Virginia on the production of all gas

NOTES

majority and Justice Holmes are following their own past ideas
logically. The majority are looking at "the necessary operation"
of the statute, to use their own words; and that necessary operation is to restrict and burden interstate commerce. Justice Holmes
is looking at the subject-matter covered by the statute, at its immediate effect; and he refuses to base his judgment upon its operation, its final effect. The same difference in views, as to the proper
way to look at a statute involving the commerce clause, was exhibited by the majority and by Justice Holmes and the other justices who concurred in his dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart."
From certain words used in the latter part of his opinion,"7 however, it seems doubtful whether Justice .Holmes would refuse to
consider every discrimination improper, merely because'that discrimination attached before the article became a .part -of interstate commerce. It may therefore be that, while the majority of
the court consider a discrimination against interstate commerce relating to articles which are strictly commercial in their nature,
ipso facto an unreasonable burden, and unconstitutional, Justice
Holmes believes that such a discrimination, attaching to an article
before it becomes a part of interstate commerce, may be, and in
the principal case is, a reasonable burden,"" imposed by a proper
exercise of the police power for the protection of the public welfare of the State.

P.W.
THE "PADLOCK" INJUNCTION.-The possibilities of the padlock

injunction as an effective means of enforcing the Volstead Act are
daily becoming more evident- The publicity recently accorded the
invocation of the strong right arm of the law in the State of Pennsylvania has brought this equitable remedy of the Government very
much into the limelight. But those who believe that this power to .
enjoin has lain in innocuous desuetude throughout the country and
that it was recently brought to light in the Federal courts of the
would be held valid; under the principal case, a tax by West Virginia on
the production of gas intended for shipment to other states would be held
invalid. The first tax indirectly burdens an article which is to become a
part of interstate commerce; but it does not (is the second tax does) impose
any different burden upon such an article froni that which the article intended for domestic use must bear.
U247 U. S. 251 (1918)..
'""The Constitution does not prohibit a State from securing -a reasonable preference for its own inhabitants in the enjoyment of its prodtfs 'even
when the effect of its law is to keep property within its boundaries 'tliat

otherwise would have passed outside." 43 Sup. Ct. 658, 667.

"As to the question of the imposition of a reasonable burden on intei
state commerce by a state, see Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution (922),

244, 245
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Keystone State are in error; it has been previously used.' It is true,
however, that district attorneys were slow to realize the potency
of the remedy open to them.
The right acquired by state district attorneys under title II,
section 22 of the Volstead Act and under the various state enforcement acts to file bills for padlock injunctions has been exercised in
very few jurisdictions. 2 For example, in Pennsylvania, where the
Act of March 27th, 1923 (No. 25) also gives the state courts exactly the same power to erijoin nuisances which is delegated to the
Federal officials under the Volstead Act, there is no case upon record
in which the attorney general has taken advantage of this power.
It is suggested that the use of this dormant weapon by state authorities might not only. solve many of the problems of the means of enforcing prohibition but in addition would materially aid in relieving
the greatly over-crowded Federal dockets.
The last-mentioned condition, that is, the over-crowded Federal
dockets, is largely to blame for the paucity of case law upon the
subject of padlock injunctions. The decrees in most instances are
entered, and the judge, who is too pressed for time to write an
opinion, merely expresses his ideas from the bench. Hence, the
precedent thus established binds only the court of that district.
However, a sufficiently large number of opinions have been
reported to ascertain to some extent the essential prerequisites which
must be established by the Government before a padlock injunction
will issue.
The Volstead Act defines the maintenance of a place where
the act is violated by the manufacture, sale, etc., of intoxicating
liquor as a common nuisance.3 This same section declares that the
person who maintains such a nuisance commits a misdemeanor and
is subject to 15unishment by fine or imprisonment or both. The subsequent sectioni empowers a court of equity to enjoin this person
from further violation of the law and gives it authority to abate the
nuisance by ordering the place closed for a year.' These sections
will be referred to more -specifically hereafter.
Obviously before a padlock injunction will even be considered,
it is necessary for the Government to establish that the respondent
has been guilty of a crime-i. e., maintaining a nuisance contrary to
'Not only has the remedy by injunction been invoked in many other
district courts as will appear post, but this method of enforcing prohibition
has been used in Pennsylvania Federal Courts since shortly after the
passage of the act. United States v. Schott, 265 Fed. 429 (1920).
The following states have enforced prohibition by means of the power

to enjoin in their own courts, Arkansas (Adams v. State, 240 S. W. $,
1922); Iowa (Fritz v. Dist. Ct., 191 N. W. 513, 1923); Missouri (State v.
Huck, 246 S. W. 303, 1922); Texas (ex parte Marcx, 246 S. W. 81, i92);

and a few others.
'Title II, section 21, hereafter referred to as section 21.
'Tittle 11, section 22, hereafter referred to as section 22.

NOTES

the act. It is equally obvious, since the bill for an injunction is in
equity and not at law, that the judge and not a jury must be satisfied that the crime has been committed. Since it is clear that the
Eighteenth Amendment gives Congress the police'power necessary
to enforce it,' and since it follows that Congress has no less police
power within the limitations of the Eighteenth Amendment than a
state has to enforce a similar constitutional amendment,' the constitutionality of an act of Congress declaring a condition a nuisance
and giving equity the power to enjoin the same has been undisputed
since the famous case of Mugler v. Kansas.7 While the padlock
clause was not contained in the Kansas statute 8 involved in that
case, any reasonable method of abating a nuisance is not in conflict
with the due process clause of the Constitution and is an implied
police power.9 It seems clear that the padlock method of abatement
is the only sure way of accomplishing the purpose of the injunction
and is therefore reasonable.
It is still decidedly uncertain under just what circumstances a
padlock injunction will issue. A recent case states that "that which
constitutes a common nuisance for the purpose of a criminal prosecution will also constitute a common nuisance sufficient to support
any action in equity." 10 It is believed that this statement is misleading.
Unquestionibly before any injunction will issue under the act
it is first necessary to establish that the respondent has been guilty of
the misdemeanor defined in section 21. In other words, the judge
must be convinced that the defendant has maintained a "room, hous,
building, boat, vehicle, structure or place where intoxicating liquor is
manufactured, sold; kept, or bartered" in violation of the act.
On a criminal indictment for maintaining a nuisance it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty. If a bill in equity to enjoin the maintenance of a nuisance is brought it must appear "to the satisfaction
of the court" that the respondent has maintained a nuisance before
The permanent injunction
a preliminary injunction will issue.!'
'United States v. Cohen, _26 Fed.

42o (192o);

State of Rhbde. :sland

..
v. Palmer, 253 U. S. 350 (1920).
.•
'268 FecLiat .26.
1 123 U. S.623 (1887); it was so held in Lewinsohn v. U. S., n8 Fed.
421 (1922); U. S. v. Reinking, 283 Fed. 855 (i922) and U. S. v. Reisenweber, 288 Fed. 52o (1923).
'Act of May 1st, i88i, the purpose of which was to provide means of

enforcing art. 15, sec. io of the constitution of Kansas, which forbade the
manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor.
'See Taylor, Due Process of Law (1917, 4o and numerous cases col-

lected therein, For an example of the far-reaching power of equity to abate

a nuisance, see Laundry v. Des Moines,

239

U. S. 486" (1916).

"United States V. Eilert Brewing Co., 278 Fed.. 659
I

Section 2.

(i92i).
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will issue if it appears that "the material allegations of the petition
are true." 12 "Such action shall be brought and tried as an action in
equity." 1
The sufficiency of the evidence required to establish a fact in
equity is generally said to be the same as is required in a civil court
5
It
of law."4 That is, a preponderance of evidence is sufficient."
is not necessary to establish a fact beyond any reasonable doubt.
So, technically, it .would take more convincing evidence to convict
a defendant of a misdemeanor than it would to obtain an injunction against him. But, as will be shown, the courts have jealously
guarded their mighty power to enjoin, and this distinction is purely
academic and theoretical. And taking into consideration the human
element, surely no judge would be satisfied that a fact was true
unless all his reasonable doubts were dispelled.
Since the courts are empowered to enjoin the condition defined as a common nuisance and a misdemeanor under section 21,
the tests of the sufficiency of the acts which constitute a nuisance
should be the same in law and equity. The satisfaction of the judge
that a nuisance exists is, as has been stated, the first prerequisite to
the issuance of an injunction under section 22. Many cases
have interpreted the definition of a nuisance in section 21.11 The
decisions are not at all harmonious but lack of space prohibits a
discussion of them in this note. This interesting subject is dealt
with in another note in this issue of this REvIEw.
Assuming that the acts of the respondent bring him within the
purview of the definition of a nuisance, will equity without more
grant an injunction? The court at this point has power to enjoin
the nuisance by ordering the respondent not to violate the lawY This
order is ipso facto an abatement of the nuisance. The padlock power
is a supplemental method of abatement which the court may invoke
in its discretion.' s
IId.
Id.
"21 C. J. 559.
u

"Wigmore (1923 ed.) vol. 5,sec. 2498.
'These cases are collected in Wheeler, Federal and State Laws Relating to Intoxicating Liquor (3d ed., i92I) 52; Kelly, Federal Prohibition
Digest (1922) 67; Blackmore, Prohibition (923) 249; 71 U. oF PA. L Rxv.
1T,,If it is made to appear by affidavits or otherwise, to the satisfaction of the court, or judge in vacation, that such nuisance exists, a temporary writ of injunction shall forthwith issue restraining the defendant from
conducting or permitting the continuance of ,such nuisance until the conclusion of the trial." This quotation is an excerpt from title II, section =z
""And upon judgment of the court ordering such nuisance to be abated,
the court may order that the room, house, building, structure, boat, vehicle,
Exor place shall not be occupied or used for one year thereafter; . . .
cerpt from title 1I,section 22.

NOTES

So before considering the occasions which have moved the
court to order a place where a nuisance is maintained, closed for a
year, it is necessary to determine when the respondent will be restrained from breaking the law. Upon a first reading of the act it
seems that the court has no discretion if satisfied that a nuisance
exists. "On finding that the material allegations of the petition are
true, the court shall order that no liquors shall be manufactured,"
etc.2"

Surprisingly few opinions have considered whether section 22
giving equity power to enjoin the nuisance is mandatory or gives the
court discretion. The few cases 20 which flatly decide this point
arrive at their conclusions by entirely different lines of reasoning.
In the Unitcd States v. Cohen 1 the court, after defiing a nuicansance at common law, starts with the premise that a legislature
2
not make a thing a nuisance which obviously is not one. Therefore, the opinion says, Congress must have intended to invoke the
jurisdiction of equity only when the acts of the respondent constituted a nuisance in the legal meaning of the word.23 The court
goes on to say:
"If this provision conferring jurisdiction in equity to declare the existence of a common nuisance is to be upheld at all
as constitutionally valid, of necessity, I think, it must be upon
some such ground that any and all other remedies are inadequate." 24
Thus that case in the last analysis seems to uphold the discretionary power of a court of equity to grant the injunction, on the
" Italics ours. Title II, section

22.

' In Shore v. U. S., 282 Fed. 857 (1i2), the court's right to use discretion is taken for granted; but see United States v. Cohen, 268 Fed. 42o
(192o) and United States v. Engel Brewing Co., No. 2677 in Equity (1923),
Dist. Ct for East. Dist. of Pa.
'Supra, note 2o.
'This conclusion is based upon the ruling of the Supreme Court of
the United States in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (894) in which case
it is stated, at page 140, that "while the Legislature has no authority to
declare that a nuisance which, is clearly not so . . . if the object to be
accomplished is conducive to public interest, it may exercise a large liberty
of choice in the means employed." But the place where intoxicating liquors
were iold contrary to law was not a nuisance at common law unless the.
additional element of vexing and annoying the public was present. See
U. S. v. Reisenweber, 288 Fed. 523 (1923).
'Whether equity can be given power to enjoin a particular crime,
should, it is submitted, depend upon whether, that delegation of power to
a court of chancery is a reasonable use of the police power of the legislature. Prior to Mugler v. Kansas (supra, note 7) it was extremely doubtful
whether an act giving equity power to enjoiri a 'crime which was not a
nuisance at common" law was constitutional Just how far the legislature
may go in this respect is still uncertain.
"268 Fed. 42% at 424.
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ground that an equitable decree would be unconstitutional if there
were an adequate remedy at law. This, it is submitted, is an unsafe
conclusion. The separate jurisdictions of equity and law were established long before the constitution and seem based upon precedent
and not upon a constitutional guaranty that equity and law will not
take concurrent jurisdiction. It seems, therefore, that a statute
giving equity power to enjoin a nuisance which is also a crime,
would only be unconstitutional if the power given equity was an
unreasonable exercise of the police power and hence void under the
due process or trial by jury clauses.
J.,
However, the same desirable result is reached by McKeehan,
5
in the recent case of United Statcs v. Engel Brewing Co. in an
opinion which seems both sound and logical. It was there stated
that while there were mandatory words in the act which seemed to
require an injunction to issue when it was established that a nuisance existed, section 22 also stated that the action was to be
brought as an action in equity and that it must appear that the
material allegations of the petition were true. The court concludes
drom this that: (I) it is a material allegation of every bill in equity
that the complainant has no adequate remedy at law; (2) it is well
established that equity will only enjoin if 6therwise the complainant
would suffer irreparable injury. Since the act states that the action
shall be tried as an action in equity there is nothing to show that
Congress intended to strip the court of its traditional right to use
discretion and grant an injunction in cases of urgency only.
So, it is probably established that a court of equity will only
enijoin a nuisance under the Volstead Act when the chancellor, in
the exercise of his sound discretion, feels that such a decree is
necessary.
By the express wording of section 22 the court is given discretion as to whether it will make violation of the injunction impossible for a year by ordering the premises closed.
It is obvious that since the courts of equity hesitate to invoke
even the personal injunction decree, they will be even more conservative about the use of the severe padlock method of abatement.
While no cases have been reported which show what additional
facts are necessary to move a chancellor to the use of this decree,
the writer has made a study of a number of unreported padlock
decrees. The information thus acquired and added to by unofficial
records of cases in distant jurisdictions has convinced him that a
padlock injiinction will issue only when' the chancellor feels that
there is a necessity for abatement by means of such a severe remedy.
The following are examples of cases in which the courts have
felt that a necessity existed: (I) where the respondent had violated
a decree enjoining him from further breach of the law; (2) where
No. 2677 In Equity (xga.3), in the D. C. for the Eastern District of Pa.

The decree was refused on other grounds, so the opinion is a dictum.

NOTES

the respondent had continued to violate the law subsequent to a
criminal conviction for breach of some clause in the act: (3) upon
satisfactory proof that the respondent was a notorious and persistent
violat6r of the Volstead Act; (4) where the health or safety of the
community were endangered, as by proof of the sale of poisonous
liquor by the respondent; (5) where the respondent's place of business had become a nuisance to the community in the common law
sense of the word, because of disorderly conduct, etc.
Unquestionably the moral effect of padlock injunctions upon
others who are engaging in the liquor trade will be very great.
Landlords will be careful to turn out tenants with "bootlegging"
tendencies, and owners will think twice before subjecting themselves
to a possible deprivation of their place of business for the period of
a year.
Summarizing, it appears that a padlock injunction will issue
if the following prerequisites are shown to exist: (i) that the respondent has been guilty of maintaining a common nuisance under
section 21; (2) that a conviction for a misdemeanor would not
give the Government an adequate remedy, and that the injury would
be irreparable if an injunction were not granted; (3) that it appear
to the chancellor that the ordinary form of abatement by an injunction restraining further breach would also be inadequate.
C..T.
THE TEST OF A COMMON

NUISANCE

UNDER

THE VOLSTEAD

Ac.-The so-called "nuisance clause" of the National Prohibition
Act

1

provides that "Any

.

. . place where intoxicating liquor

is manufactured, sold, kept or bartered in violation of this title, ...
is hereby declared to be a common nuisance." The state and Federal governments are granted two modes of attacking such nuisance;
first, by criminal prosecution, section 21 further providing that "any
person who maintains such a common nuisance shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor"; second, by injunction in equity, section 22 2 stating
that "an action to enjoin any nuisance defined in this title may be
.as an action in equity."
.
".
brought .The question naturally arises as to hat factors are required
by the courts to constitute the nuisance defined, and also whether
the requirements are the same for the criminal prosecution as for
the equitable remedies." An examination of the cases fails to show
any clear uniform test to apply in ascertaining whether any given
facts constitute a common nuisance and some cases seek to make the
(4T

Stat. 374) October 28,
see. 22.

'Same,

1919,

Title II, Sec:

21.
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greater for an injunction than for a criminal proserequirements
3
cution.
It is impossible to ascertain from the cases within what limits
must be the relation of the person against whom the action is
brought to the place where the nuisance is alleged to be maintained.
Of course, the proprietor or manager of the place may be guilty. It
has been held that'a bartender making sales in a saloon may be convicted' on the ground that he aided and abetted a misdemeanor and
is therefore guilty as principal in maintaining a nuisance. Under
a similar clause in a state act, "maintains" is held to imply some
control or management of the place, the court holding that a mere
servant does not "maintain" a place., A person who was both a
member and an officer of a club has been held guilty of maintaining
a nuisance by making sales himself at the club. 6 A landlord who,
with knowledge and opportunity to do so, fails to prevent violations
by a tenant on his premises may be guilty according to one case,'
while another holds that mere failure to prevent violation by a tenant cannot render the landlord guilty.8 The cases in equity offer no
basis for defining the limits of the required relation.
Section 21 contains no mention of a mental element in the
offense of maintaining a common nuisance, the mere maintaining
being an offense according to the words of the act. But the courts
are loath to construe statutes providing for a criminal offense as
requiring no intent and, though the criminal cases do not specifically
require it, they all infer that some mental element is necessary: at
least a knowledge of the violation? A Federal court holds that even
the bill for injunction must allege knowledge of the violation on the
part of the respondent' 0 though in construing a similar clause in a
state act, a state court holds that ignorance or good faith is no
defense to a bill for an injunction."
The definition, in addition to stating that "any place" may be
such a nuisance, also covers specifically most possibilities as follows: "Any room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure, or
place," "1 and the courts could not logically do otherwise than to
3

U. S. v. Cohen, 268 Fed. 420 (192o), U. S. v. Butler, 278 Fed. 677

(192:2).

"Veseley v. U. S., 276 Fed. 693 (1921).
'State v. Bussi, 121 Wash. 314, 209 Pa' Page v. U. S., 278 Fed. 41 (19=).
'Reynolds v. U. S., 28z Fed. 256 (1922).
sPresont v. U. S., 281 Fed. 131 (i922).
'Wiggins v. U. S., 272 Fed. 41 (1921).

523 (1922).

IOU. S. v. Butler, supra, in note 3.
21Darnell

'Note

v. Castana Drug Co., I94 Ia. 215, x88 N. W. 935 (1922).

i, supra.

NOTES

construe that any place in which or from which liquor can be "manufactured, sold, kept, or bartered" may be such a nuisance. A private residence may be such place. 3 Under a like clause in a state
act, a freight car in which liquor had been shipped and from which,
on a siding, deliveries of liquor were made, was held to be such a
place maintained as a nuisance." An automobile used merely for
transportation was not a nuisance, bccause the word "kept" in the
definition ' means "kept for sale," but the court infers that it might
be such if used for the purposes set forth in the definition.16
The point upon which the courts are most in discord, and which
is undoubtedly the central factor in the whole question, is what acts
'in violation shall be sufficient to constitute a nuisance. .The definition describes as a nuisance a place "where intoxicating liquor is
manufactured, sold, kept or bartered in violation" 27 of the act. By
definition, therefore, proof of manufacturing, selling, keeping or
bartering liquor without a permit for beverage purposes at any place,
would seem to be sufficient to constitute that place a nuisance. But
the word "kept" having been held to mean "kept for sale," Is proof
of mere possession at that place would not be enough,' 9 unless no
evidence is offered which rebuts the presumption that it is possessed
in violation of the act, such a presumption being raised by section 33
of the act20 which provides that possession is prima facie evidence of
violation.
In a prosecution for a misdemeanor it has been held that-a
single violation of the act is enough to constitute the place where
it occurs a common nuisance and to make the person committing the
violation guilty of maintaining a common nuisance."' Other cases,
loosely stating the rule as above, prove on examination to contain,
in addition to proof of a single sale, other evidence clearly indicating that it is only one in the course of many." One case definitely
states that a single sale without other evidence is not sufficient,2
and for this construction there is good reason in that other sections
of the act provide adequate punishment for such an offense.24 The
"Fossolla v. U. S., 285 Fed. 378
"State v. Gioffredi, i75 N. W. 747

(1922).

(Iowa ig2o).

"Supra, in note i.
"U. S. v. One Cadillac Touring Car, 274 Fed. 47q (1921).
"t Supra, in note i.
' Supra, in note i6.
"U. S. v. Dowling, 278 Fed. 630' Ciar).
"Note I, supra, sec. 33 and Barker v. U. S., 289 Fed.-249 (1923).
'Young v. U. S., 272 Fed. 967 (192X, Feigin v. U. S., 2z9 Fed. io7
(1922).
( Wiggins v. U. S., supra, in note 9.
' Muncy v. U. S., 289 Fed. 783 (1923).
"See Barker y. U. S., 289 Fed. 249,25o (i923).
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better rule as shown by the facts if not statements in the majority
of cases, is that a single violation is enough only if under circumstances showing it to be one in a continuous or habitual course of
conduct.2 5 To be guilty of a misdemeanor a person must be "maintaining" 28 the common nuisance and the word "maintain" has been
held to imply a continuance of the violations-that the violations
must occur over a period of time.2 7 It is submitted that the above
rule falls in line with this interpretation and that direct proof of
several separate sales is unnecessary, though, of course, the existence of the nuisance is more manifest in such cases. 8 It has been
held that no direct proof of sale is necessary if the surrounding
circumstances conclusively show that selling in violation of the law
is the usual course of business of the place.29
The clause granting equity jurisdiction does not contain the
-,ord "maintain," providing merely that "an action to enjoin any
nuisance defined in this title may be brought" 30 in equity. Nevertheless, the courts have differed as to whether continuance of viola-.
tion is required to establish a nuisance in equity. Faris, J., in U. S.
v. Cohcn, states "' that "a single sale without more and with no evidence of the continuatibn-or recurrence of law violation or of facts
strongly indicating32 either habitual sales or long continued violations," 33 will not constitute a nuisance. On the other hand, Westenhaven, J., in U. S. v. Eilert Brewing Co.,34 takes exception to that
statement of the rule and claims that "a single sale accompanied by
the unlawful possession of other liquor has been held sufficient,"
citing three criminal cases in support of this, and maintaining that
since the definition of a nuisance in the act is the same for both
criminal and equitable remedies the requirements must be the same.
Of the three criminal cases which he cites, only one supports his
point; " of the other two, one does not squarely decide that question "I and the other contains "facts strongly indicating . ..habitual
Herine v U. S., z76 Fed. 807 (i9g2) and under a similar clause in a
State Act, State v. Jenkins, 213 Pac. 59o (Mont. 1923). See also Lewinsohn v. U. S., 278 Fed. 421 (1922); Hohenadel v. U. S., No. a289, Oct.
Term, 1923, C. C. A. 3d Dist.
" Supra, in note x.
"U. S. v. Dowling, 278 Fed. 580 (1922).
'Carpenter v. U. S., 28o Fed. 599 (i922); Ryan v. U. S., 285 Fed.

,34

(192).

' Kathriner v. U. S., 276 Fed.
*Supra, in note 2.
"Supra, in note'3.
Italics are our own.

808 (192i).

Supra, in note 3.
Fed. 659 (1922).
=Young v. U. S, supra, in note
2278

" Gray v. U. S., 276 Fed. 395

2t.

(1921).
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sales." " At common law a common nuisance carries with it the
idea of continual, habitual, or recurring acts and it seems a reasonable interpretation to hold that Congress, in using the word, intended
that it should carry its usual meaning. 8 Therefore, it seems a
better rule to require a continuance of violation for the equitable
remedy as for the criminal. It is submitted that the rule applicable to both is well elucidated in the following statement of Evans, J.,
in Lewinsohn v. U. S."' "Counsel stresses the necessity of proving
repeated sales

.

.

.

but such a test is neither an accurate nor

an exclusive one. There could be an almost irrefutable conclusion
drawn from one single sale, provided the facts surrounding such
sale warranted the inference that it was one of the ordinary and
usual incidents of the business."
From the foregoing it is evident that the cases interpreting
the nuisance clause of the Volstead Act are far from harmonious,
and, instead of furnishing clear-cut rules for its enforcement, do
little more than permit the formation of reasonable opinions.
TnE EFFECT OF THE SHERMAN ACT UPON MONOPOLIES IN
ENTERPRISES.-The fertile field of monopoly presented by the business of furnishing amusement has, to a great degree, escaped the prohibitions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act I and
the Clayton Act,2 by reason of the fact that such enterprises have
been so often held to involve interstate commerce only incidentally,
and, therefore, not to be subject to the control of Congress. This
has been the general rule in the cases involving operatic 3 and
dramatic 4 productions; and so also with regard to professional baseball games? On the other hand, in cases involving the exhibition
A.iMUSEMENT-

Wiggins v. U. S. s4upra, in note 9.
'U. S. v. Cohen, .spra, in note 3; yood, Nuisances, sed. 778
'Supra, in note 25.
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Act of'July 2, 1890,
Sec. I, 26 Stat. 1 209.

"It

shall be unlawful f6i any person engaged in commerce, in the

course of such commerce either directly or -indirectly to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities sold . . . within the
United States . . . Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent
discrimination . . . on account of difference in grade, quality, or quantity
of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for difference in
the cost of selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the sane
or different communities made in good faith to meet competition." Act'of.
Oct. 15, 1914, Sec. 2; 38 Stat. L. 730.

'Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 231 N. Y. 5o7, 116 N. E.
xo6x (19x7), affirming" 162 App. Div. 691, 147 N. Y. S. 532 (1914).
"Compare Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, 239 U. S. 56o (igTS).
'Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922).
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of moving pictures, where films are procured from companies domiciled and operating in another state, interstate commerce is held to
be a substantial element of the business, so as to make the distributors subject to the Sherman Act.6 The question when such commerce ceases to be an incident and becomes one of the important
elements of a business of this general character has been the subject of several recerit decisions in the United States Supreme Court.
A contract, or combination, to fall within the ban of the Sherman Act must have a direct and immediate, not a merely indirect or
incidental, effect upon interstate commerce.!
The boundary between those businesses which directly involve interstate commerce
and those which do so only incidentally isi of course, vague, and not
susceptible of precise definition. The Supreme Court has simply
placed each case as it has arisen on one side or the other of this
boundary, and has made no further attempt at its demarcation.
Thus, combinations or contracts restraining manufacture or production primarily, were early held exempt on the ground that interstate commerce was only incidentally affected. 8 In the field of
amusement, the question never came before the Supreme Court
until 1917, when, without an opinion, the court affirmed a decision
of the District Court, holding that a combination of distributors of
motion picture films for the purpose of controlling that business was
illegal under the Sherman Act.9 No further expression of opinion
on this subject was given until 1922. Then, within less than two
years, three opinions were handed down which go far toward establishing the boundary line in this field.
In the case of Federal Baseball Club v. National League,0 the
court held that major league baseball did not come under the provisions of the act. The important part of such business, said the
court, speaking through 'Mr. Justice Holmes, is in the contest held
within the state. The mere fact that some interstate transportation
is necessary to prepare for such contest does not bring it within the
provisions of the act.
Then the court was presented with a case of the type which
seems the most difficult to classify in this field-the vaudeville circuit. The business of such companies seems analogous to that of
the baseball leagues. They present vaudeville at theatres in various
cities and pay for the transportation of the performers and their
'U. S. v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 Fed. 8oo (i915), appeal dismissed, 247 U. S. 524 (917); Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film
Mlfg. Co., 235 Fed. 398 (1916), affirmed 243 U. S. 5o2 (1917).
'U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., i.6 U. S. i (1894); Hopkins v. U. S., 171
U. S. 578 (1898).
"U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., supra, in note 7.
'U. S. v. Motion, Picture Patents Co., supra, in note 6.
"Federal Baseball Club. v. National League, supra, in note 5.
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paraphernalia from the scene of one performance to that of another.
Yet in the face of the Federal Baseball Case " the Supreme Court.
refused to dismiss a suit under the Sherman Act against a combination in restraint of competition in this business. 2 But there was no
*decisionon the merits in this case, and the status of combinations
in this particular business remains very indefinite in view of previous
decisions in the Federal courts. One case in the district court has
held that the business of furnishing vaudeville acts to various theatres in another state was interstate commerce and subject to the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act.18 On the other hand, in a case
not involving the Sherman Act, but the right of the state to control
such business, the Supreme Court held that the business involved
interstate commerce only incidentally, and was therefore subject
to state control." WhVether the Supreme Court would hold that
such business is subject to the Sherman Act is matter of conjecture under these decisions.
The last of these three recent decisions is the case of Binderup
v. PathW Exchange, Inc." In this case the plaintiff was a local
distributor, as well as an exhibitor, of motion pictures. The various
distributors outside the state conspired through their agents within
the state to stop the plaintiff's supply of films in order to usurp hislocal distributing business. The court held that this was a conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce, and allowed the plaintiff to recover damages under the Sherman Act. The court did not
discuss the matter, but appeared to take it for granted that interstate*
commerce was an essential part of the plaintiff's as well as the
defendant's business.
From a comparison of these decisions, it appears that those
amusements which consist chiefly in personal efforts of performers, who incidentally travel from state to state, do not come within
the scope of the act. The baseball games fall under this head and
the vaudeville performances will probably fall into the same category, although it has not yet been so decided. In those enterprises
the main work is done, the major portion of the expense is incurred, within the state, and interstate commerce is involved only
incidentally in preparation for the exhibition. On the other hand,
in moving-picture exhibitions, one of the greatest of the expenses
incurred is the transportation of the films from New York or Cali.
fornia. In many ways the thing is produced beyond the state line
and senrt in for reproduction within the state. • In fact, the business
"Note i, supra.
'Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 26z U. S. 27I (1923).
'Marienelli v. United Booking Co., 221 Fed. i6s (1x4).
"Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert, supra, in note 4.

" 1Binderup v. Path6 Exchange, Inc., Supreme Court of the' United
States, No. 77, October Term, 1923.
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consists largely in short leases of these films to be sent across the
state line. It is analogous to buying and selling across state lines,
and seems clearly to be in its essence interstate commerce, as much
so as is the business of buying commodities from another state, to
sell them within the state, instead of exhibiting them for a certain
price, as here. The distinction drawn in these cases between these
two classes of amusement enterprises seems well founded and seems
likely to be maintained in subsequent cases in the field.

G.F.F.
THE

TRANSFER OF A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT BY WRITING A

GUARANTY THERmoN.-The payee of a negotiable instrument sometimes transfers the instrument by writing on the back of it a guaranty of payment, instead of any of the well established forms of
indorsement.1 These guaranties generally take some such form as
"I guarantee payment of the within note," and often there is in2
addition a waiver of demand, protest, and notice of non-payment.
The courts have had great trouble in determining the legal effect
of such guaranties, both as to the rights of the transferee under
the guaranty, and as to the liability of the transferor. There is one
line of reasoning which leads to the conclusion that such a guaranty
is equivalent to a commercial indorsement; another leads to the
directly opposite conclusion.
The cases present the problem in two aspects, one as to the
passing of title to the transferee, the other as to the liability incurred
by the maker of such a guaranty.
The recent case of Rawlins County Bank 'v. Rummel 3 holds
that a transfer by writing a guaranty on the instrument has the
same effect in the hands of a holder for value as a commercial
indorsement, and passes legal title to the transferee, free from defenses which the maker might have against the transferor. This
is in accord with the numerical weight of authority.' The general
'Only such guaranties will be considered here. Guaranties on separate
papers, and guaranties by persons who are not payees or indorsees are not
included.
'Guaranties of the collectability of instruments are not here considered.
They cannot have the force of commercial indorsements. Vanderveer v.
Wright, 6 Barb. 547 (N. Y. 1849), distinguishes a guiranty of collectability
from a guaranty of payment.
'22-o
ac. 255 (Kan. 1923).
'Delk v. City Nat. Bank, 85 Okla. 238, 205 Pac. 753 (1922); Jones
County Bank v. Kurt, 192 Iowa 965, 182 N. W. 409 (ig2i); Hendrix v.
Bauhard, 138 Ga. 473, 75 S. E. 588 (1912); First Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 157
Mich. 192, 121 N. W. 8oo (19o9); Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Galland, 14
Wash. 502, 45 Pac. 35 ('896); Dunham v. Peterson, 5 N. D. 414, 67 N. W.
293 (1896); State Bank v. Haylin, T4 Neb. 480, 16 N. W. 754 (x883); Robinson v. Lair, 31 Iowa 9 (i870).
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reasoning of the cases which favor this view may be briefly stated
as follows: The signature of the transferor is a blank indorsement,
which, by implication of law, p"zes title and also is a promise by the
indorser to pay the instrument on default of the maker; the signed
guaranty is simply this blank indorsement with one-half of the usual
meaning expressed, and there is nothing in the expression of this
part which negatives or restricts the blank indorsement created by
the signature. Consequently title passes as by a blank indorsement.
It is also insisted, and somewhat more convincingly, that a guaranty
by a payee would be meaningless unless it were intended that title
should pass to somebody, as otherwise it would be a guaranty by a
man to himself;' and since the instrument was originally negotiable, it is fair to assume that the transferor intended to pass it by
negotiation.
On the other hand there is authority in a respectable minority.
of jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court, that
comes to the opposite conclusion.7 Cases in these jurisdictions deny
that the reasoning of the majority cases is sound. They point out
that a blank indorsement admits of the implication of its terms only
because it is in blank and no terms are expressed; but that here is a
fully expressed contract, into which a court has no right to imply
other provisions.8 If these premises are accepted as sound, it is
evident that there are no written words of transfer on the instrument, and that the transfer is entirely parol. Why, then, should it
not be treated as any other parol transfer? The courts that take the
minority view so treat these guaranties, holding that they operate as
assignments only, not as indorsements, and that no legal title nor
any right to be free from defenses is acquired by the transferee:
On the question of liability there is also a pronounced split
of opinion between the cases which hold the transferor liable as on
a commercial indorsement and entitled to demand, protest, and
notice of non-payment, and those that hold him liable only as guarantor. Although the problem is distinct from that of the passing
'Cases in note 4, supra, also 2 Daniel-Negotiable Instruments, 1781.
See also Y Daniel 688c, and Leahy v. Haworth, Y3 C. C. A. 84, 14l Fed.
850 (i9o5), where the same reasoning is applied to assignments indorsed

on instruments.

4Hendrix v. Bauhard, .Yupra, note 4; Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank,
58 Kan. 43, 48 Pac. 587 (1897).
'Central Trust Co. v. 1st Nat. Bank, ioi U. S. 68 (879); Omaha Nat.
Bank v. Walker, 2 McCrary 56, 5 Fed. 399 (C. C. ig8i); Ireland v. Floyd,
42 Okla. 6og, 142 Pac. 401 (1914), now overruled in Okla.; Lamourieux v.
Hewitt, s Wend. 307 (N. Y. 183o); Canfield v. Vaughan, 8 Mart. 682 (La.

182o); Taylor v. Binney, 7 Mass. 479 (18").
I "In this case the guaranty on the note was filled up. It expressed fully

tb

contract between the Cook County Bank and the Trust Co.

Being ex-

press, it can raise no implication of any other contract." Strong, J., in Central Trust Co. v. ist Nat. Bank, supra note 7.
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of title, the distinction is rarely made by the language of the courts.
MNuch the same reasoning is used in the liability cases as in the title
cases to prove or deny that the effect is that of a commercial indorsement. On one side is the insistence that there is a blank indorsement with part of the contract expressed;* on the other a
denial of the right to imply anything more than is definitely expressed. 0 Where there is added to the guaranty a waiver of notice
and protest, the exponents of indorser-liability contend that unless
the transferor intended to be liable as indorser, the waiver would be
useless, since except as an indorser he would have no right to notice
The majority, on this point as in the title cases, is
and protest."
with the commercial indorsement theory.2 2
Even within some of the states there is conflict on this subject.
The record of Oklahoma in recent years is likely to dismay anyone
who is seeking for the "known certainty of the law." In that state
from 1912 to 1918 there were five cases involving the rights of a
guaranty-transferee. In the first case he was held to have the
rights of a commercial indorsee. 13 The decision in each of the four
succeeding cases was directly contrary to its immediate predecessor.1
A case in 1922 followed the 1918 case in supporting the
guaranty as a commercial indorsement.25
An early Massachusetts case held that a transferee by guaranty could erase all the words of the guaranty and let the signature
stand as a blank indorsement. 1 ' Subsequent cases in that state,
'"This (the guaranty) is saying in writing just what they say by
signing their name in blank on the back of the note, by which they say that
they will pay it if the maker does not." Nat. Bank v. McElfish, 48 W. Va.
406, 37 S. E. 541 (19oo).
"Belcher v. Smith, 7 Cush. 482 (Mass. 1851).
"Indorsement in blank induces the broadest mercantile responsibility because it is authority for the indorsee to write anything he pleases above the
name; . . . but there is no such authority where the terms are filled up.

Expressurn facit cessare taciturn, and there is no implication of a promise
where one is expressed." Snevily v. Eckel, i W. & S. 203 (Pa. 1841).
" Cady v. Bay City Land Co., 1O2 Ore. 5, 2oi Pac. 179 (i92); Mangold Bank v. Utterback, 54 Okla. 655, i6o Pac. 713 (igx6).
" Cady v. Bay City Land Co., supra, note ii; ist Nat. Bank v. Baldwin,
too Neb. 25, isg N. W. 371 (i9i6); Ist Nat. Bank v. Shaw, supra, note 4;
Voss v. Chamberlain, 139 Iowa 569, 17 N. W. 269 (i9o8); Nat. Bank v.
McElfish, supra, note 9; Donnerberg v. Oppenheimer, i5 Wash. 290, 46 Pac.
254 (1896); Partridge v. Davis, 20 Vt. 499 (1848).
'McNary v. Farmers Bank, 33 Okla.-, 124 Pac. 286 (1912).

"'Ireland v. Floyd, supra, note 7 (1914); Mangold Bank v. Utterback,

supra, note ii (Jan. i916) ; Douglas v. Brown, 56 Okla. 6, Is5 Pac. 887 (Feb.
1916); ist Nat. Bank v. Cummings, xii Pac. 862 (Okla. x918).
Delk v. City Nat. Bank, supra, note 4.
Blakeley v. Grant, 6 Mass. 386 (18io).

NOTES

however, refuse to treat the guaranty as an indorsement," although
the language of a few is not entirely clear.
The attitude of the New York courts, in spite of indefinite language in some of the cases, seems to be with the minority view, refusing to treat the guaranty as a commercial indorsement.1 8 Most
of the New York cases involve the liability side of the problem, but
Lamourieux v. Hewitt '" is a clear case holding that no title passes.
The Pennsylvania law is found in the early case of Snevily v.
EckCl.2 0 This is a case involving liability, but the language is emphatic to the effect that the guaranty could not operate as an indorsement in any way. There is, however, a dictum by Paxson, J.,
in another case, which is contra."I
Unfortunately the Negotiable Instruments Law does not definitely deal with these questions. A few words in that act could
have set the matter at rest permanently. But the framers failed to
deal with a situation that was in great need of settlement, and as a
consequence the law has been left in as great confusion as it was
before the act. A number of cases since the act have not referred to
it at all.2" Others, although apparently relying to a large extent
on the authority of earlier cases, seek to apply certain of the general sections of the act to support their views in favor of the guaranty operating as a commercial indorsement. s The most directly
applicable is section 63.24 Section 17, s. 6 25 is quoted, 2 but is not
properly applicable, since it deals with the effect of the improper
"Taylor v. Binney, supra, note 7; Tuttle v. Bartholomew, 12 Metc. 452
(Mass. 1847); Belcher v. Smith, supra, note io; Edgerly v. Lawson, 176

Mass. 551, 57 N. E. io2o (igoo). Cf. Upham v. Prince, 22 Mass. r4 (1815)
and criticism of the case in Miller v. Gaston, 2 Hill i88 (N. Y. 1842).
"Deck v. Works, 18 Hun 266 (N. Y. 1879); Small v. Sloan, 14 N. Y.
Super (r Bosworth) 352 (1857); Brown v. Curtis, 2 N. Y. 225 (1849);
Miller v. Gaston, supra, note i7. Contra: Leggett v. Raymond, 6 Hill 63.
(N. Y. 1844); also dicta in MeLaren v. Watson's Ex'rs., 26 Wend. 425 (N.
Y. 1840.
"Supra, note 7.
"Supra, note io
Dunning v. Heller, io3 Pa. 269 (x883).

'Cady v. Bay City Land Co., supra, note Ii; ist Nat. Bank v. Baldwin,

supra note i2; .tst Nat. Bank v. Shawr, supra, note 4; Voss v. Chamberlain,
supra, note 1.2..

"Jones" County Bank v. Kurt, supra, note 4;- Mangold Bank v. Utter-

back, supra, note 11.
""A person placing his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as
maker, drawer, or acceptor, is deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly
indicates by appropriate words his intention to be bound in some other capacity."
"!Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not
clear in what caiacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is

to be deemed an -indorser"
Mangold Bank v. Utterback, supra, note ii.
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location of signatures on the instrument. 2 There is no question of
the position of the signature involved in the ordinary guaranty case.
One case, 28 after deciding that the guaranty is not a restrictive indorsement, holds that section 4729 applies to prevent impairment of
negotiability by the guaranty, and that consequently title passes.
From the standpoint of reasoning there is much to be said for
each side of the controversy here outlined. There are strong arguments in favor of *each, but as a matter of logic, those against the
commercial indorsement status would seem to have the advantage.
But, how then can it be explained that such a decided majority of
courts favor the opposite view? The answer must be that the balance was turned by a force other than logic-the force of commercial custom and necessity. Negotiability is favored by the courts, as
is illustrated by many recent cases. The Negotiable Instruments
Law has given added strength to this spirit by resolving most of
the formerly doubtful questions in favor of negotiability. Hence it
is that so many courts, when forced to choose between the two opposing views, although seldom saying so, have inclined toward the
one which enlarges, rather than restricts, negotiability. It is also
to be noted that most of the cases of the minority view are older
cases. Whether the increasing influence of commercial convenience
and the liberal spirit of the Negotiable Instruments Law would lead
to the overruling of any of these cases if the question were now
presented in their respective jurisdictions, is, of course, a matter
of mere conjecture. But such a result is not at all impossible, and
for the sake of uniformity, at least, it would be desirable.

H.C.A.
UNFAIR COMPETITION BY THE USE OF A SURNAME.-THE
VATERMAN FOUNTAIN PEN CASE.--One of the most difficult prob-

lems facing a business which has established itself in the eyes of the
public is to prevent a competitor from stealing its good-will by masquerading in its name. Passing off one's goods as those of another
has always been treated by the courts as an unfair method of trading, and many times has been stopped by injunction.' Where the
defendant happens to possess the same surname as the plaintiff, and
uses it in order to attract the latter's customers, the situation has
been difficult to cope with, because early decisions laid down the
"Germania Bank v. Marnier, 129 Wis. 544, 109 N. W. 574 (19o6).
County Bank v. Kurt, supra, note 4.

'Jones

"An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be negotiable until
it has been restrictively. indorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise."
"A very interesting book on the whole subject of unfair competition,
is Edward S. Rogers' Good Will, Trade Marks and Unfair Trading (1914).
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proposition that
a man has an absolute right to use his own name.
2
as he pleases.

Cases where a man deliberately adopts the'name of another
presents no question.' Such an action is so manifestly fraudulent
that no court would hesitate to grant the injured relief. But where
the newcomer possesses a name, well known in connection with a
certain product, and because of it enters into the business of manufacturing and marketing that product, the problem is more troublesome.
At first the courts took the position that a man was entitled to
use his own name in his own business.4 As long as he resorted to
no fraud or artifice to lead people to believe that his goods were
those of his more famous competitor, he could not be. enjoined.5
The confusion which would inevitably result from the presence of
two names in a single trade, and the detriment which the established business must certainly suffer, were held to be damnum
absque injuria.6

The dffect of this doctrine was to enable one man to usurp
another's good-will. The public, notoriously heedless in their purchases, would be certain to buy some of the products of the second
comer in the belief that they were getting goods of the original
brand. No affirmative action with intent to mislead would be necessary to effect this result. It would happen naturally, because of the
known inadvertence of the consumer.'
'Nowhere has this principle been expressed in a more epigrammatic
form than by Lord Justice Knight Bruce: "All the Queen's subjects have a
right, if they will, to manufacture and sell pickles and sauces, and not the less
that their fathers bave done so before them. All the Queen's subjects have
a right_to sell these, articles in their own names, and not the less so that
they bear the same name as their fathers." Burgess v. Burgess, 3 De G.,
M. & G. 86 (Eng. i853 ),
'Paul Poiret v. Jules Poiret et Cie., Ltd., & Nash, 37 R. P. C. 177
(rng. i92o); Sage Foundation Homes Co. v. Sage Forest Hills Associates,
iig Mics. Rep. 669, i97 N. Y. S.. 877 (1922).
"Burgess v. Burgess, supra note 2; Turton v. Turton, L. R. 42 Ch. Div.
x28 (Eng. 1889) ; Meneey v. Meneely 62 N. Y. 427 (1875) ; Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139 (1877). See also Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co, 163 U. S. "i69 (i896).
'In the great majority' of the cases where the rule was laid down, the
court felt that there was actual fraud, and accordingly granted the injunction. Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84 (Eng. 1843); Holloway v. Holloway, 13
Beav. 2o9 (Eng. 18so); Massam v. Thorley's Cattle-Food Co., L. R. r4 Ch.
Div. 748 (Lng. i88o); Charles S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co, r44
N. Y. 462, 39 N. E. 49o (1895).
'Brown Chemical Co. v. Meyer, i39 U. S. 54o (89o).
'See Edward S. Rogers, "The Unwary Purchaser," 8 Mica. L. REv.
613; and "An Account of Some Psychological Experiments on the Subject
of Trade-Mark Infringement." x8 Mica. L. REV. 75.

302

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

The courts have finally realized this and have modified their
views. They still hold that a man has a right to the use of his own
name,8 but they qualify that right.9 In the ordinary case, if there
is no fraud and no attempt to mislead, they will not interfere."'
But where a personal name has been used in connection with a certain product so long and so extensively that the mere name itself
has come to connote in the mind of the public a definite article, 1'
another individual with the same name will not be permitted to market a similar article unless he takes definite affirmative steps to prevent the public from being misled in any way.' 2 One court states
the rule as follows:
"If the name has previously become well known iii the
trade, the second comer uses it subject to three important restrictions: (t) He must not affirmatively do anything to cause
the public to believe that his article is made by the first manufacturer. (2) He-must exercise reasonable care to prevent the
public from so believing.. (3) He must exercise reasonable
care to prevent the public from believing that he is the successor in business of the first manufacturer." is
Whether a greater degree of care is enforced upon a corporation about to enter a competitive field than is required of an indi' This right he may sell, thus precluding himself absolutely from using
the name in future. Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page. 147 Mass. 206, 17
N. E. 304 (i888); Guth Chocolate Co. v. Guth, 215 Fed. 750 (194), affirmed 224 Fed. 932, 140 C. C. A. 410 (1915); 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 2x6.
His intention entirely to divest himself must be .clearly shown. It .will not
be readily presumed. Guth v. Guth, supra. And see White v. Trowbridge,
215"Pa. 1, 64 Atl. 862 (igo6); Page v. Page and Shaw Chocolate Co.,
-o Mass. Sos, 134 N. E. 377 (1922).
'Phoenix Manufacturing Co. v. White, I49 Wis. 287, i35 N. W. 89I
(i912) ; Henry Perkins Co. v. Perkins, 14o N. E. 461 (Mass. 1923); Coty,
Inc. v. Perfums de Grand Luxe, 292 Fed. 319 (D. C. 1923).
" Brinsmead v. Brinsmead, 29 Times L. R. 237 and 706, 30 R. P. C.
137 (Eng. 1913); Schinasi v. Schinasi, 169 App. Div. 887, 155 N. Y. S. 867
(i915); Thompson Lumber Co. v. Thompson Yards, 144 Minn. 298, 175
N. W. 550 (i919); Burns v. Wm.J. Burns International Detective Agency,
235 Mass. 553, 127 N. 1. 334 (1920).
'That is, where the name has acquired a "secondary meaning:' See
Nims, The Law of Unfair Competition and Trade Marks (2d ed. 1917),
chapter 4.
'Valentine Meat Juice Co. v. Valentine Extract Co., 83 L. T. (N. S.)
259, 17 R. P. C. 673 (i9oi); J. & J. Cash, Ltd. v. Joseph Cash, 86 Law
Times R. 21i, ig R. P. C. 18i (Eng. i9oa) The usual requirement is that
the newcomer must so mark his goods. that the public can tell at a glance
that he, and not his rival, is the maker. Thus, qualifying phrases were
required in most of the cases dealing with Baker's Chocolate, Rogers' Silverware, etc. See Walter Baker & Co., Ltd. v. Sanders, 8o Fed. 889, 26 C.
C. A. 220 (1897); International Silver Co. v. Rogers, 72 N. J. Eq. 933, 67
Atl. ioS (19o7). For an account of all these cases see Nims, op. cit. 125.
" Stix, Baer & Ful-er Dry Goods Co. v. American Piano Co., 211 Fed.
27!, 121 C. C. A. 639 (1913).
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vidual is a question upon which the courts do not agree. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that no distinction exists.1" The Supreme Court of New Jersey takes the opposite view.15
It is submitted that the latter is preferable. While the individual
has the traditional right, somewhat qualified in recent years, to do
business under his own name, the corporation has the whole of the
language from which to choose in selecting its title. Though it
may desire to use the name of one of its original incorporators, it
should not be permitted to do so if confusion would thereby result.
An attempt by a corporation to do business under a name already
established as the distinguishing mark of another individual or company seems to be stronger evidence of fraud than would be the
same attempt on the part of an individual.16 This is especially true
where the corporation has purchased the right to use a famous name
by giving a portion of its stock to some obscure 18possessor of that
name.1 7 Many states have statutes on the subject.
The law has granted protection to established businesses in
another way, namely, by allowing the registration of surnames as
trademarks in a limited number of cases. Under the English
Trade Marks Act of i9o5,19 and the Amending Act of 191910 it has
been held that a surname may be such a distinctive mark as to be
capable of registration. 21 This was an important decision, as previously it was extrenz.ely doubtful whether a personal name could
ever be registered. 22 While it is not required that the name be
unique, it must be rare, and must be first well established as designating the applicant's goods 23 Registration of a usual or commonplace name will be refused .2'
"Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamehs & Benedict, i98 U. S. ir8 (r9o5).
"L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin &c. Wilckles Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 39, 71 AtL

409 (198).
"See B. Forman Co. v. Forman Mfg. Co., ii9 Misc. Rep. 87, 195 N. Y.
S. 597 (19=).
"Rodgers v. Nowhill, 6 Hare '325 (Eng. 1848); James Van Dyke Co.
v. F. V. Reilly Co., 73 Misc. Rep. 87, 13o N. Y. S..755 (i9ii); G. B. McVay and Son Seed Co. v. *fcVay Seed and Floral. Co., 2o Ala. 644, 79
So. 116 (1918).
"aAlabama: Code of i9o7," Sec. 3446 .(i); New ierey, Laws of 1896,
Chap. 185, Sec. 8; New York, Laws of 1909, Chap. 28,; Sec. 6.
"5 Edw. VII, Ch. i5,Sec. 9 (5).
"a9& ioGeo. V. Ch. 7% Sec. 7.
'Teofani & Co., Ltd. v.A. Teofani (1913), 2 Ch. 545, 30 R- P; C. 446
(Eng.).
"Popes Electric Lamp Co., Ltd.'s, ApplicAtion (19i1), 2 Ch. 382, 28
R. P. C. 629 (Eng.); R. J. Lea, Ltd.'s Application (1912), 2 Ch. 32, 29
R. P. C. 165, and on appeal (1913) 1 Ch. 446, 30 R- P. C. 216 (Eng.).
"Registration has been granted the names Avery, Burford, Eno, Muratti,
etc.

For a complete list, see Kerley, Trade Marks (5th ed., r923) 2o3.

"The court has refused to register such words as Bowden, Crawford,
McEwan, and Slazenger.
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as a tradeIn the United States, the registration of a surname
mark under the Act of i88i 23 was declared invalid. " The Act of
1905,-7 however, provided that "any mark which was in actual and
exclusive use as a trade-mark of the applicant or his predecessors
from whom he derived title for ten years next before the passage
of this Act" may be registered. This was amended in 192o to per2
mit the registration-of the mark after one year's bona fide use. "
now
may
The courts have so construed the act that a personal name
from infringement through
be registered, and the owner protected
29
One bearing a similar name
direct copying or colorable imitation.
will not unmistakwill be enjoined from using it in any way which
30
It seems, however,
ably differentiate it from the one registered.
that upon taking what the court believes to be sufficient measures
the second comer may use his name with a
to prevent confusion,
1
qualifying phrase.'
In this country, the maker of practically every nationally advertised and well-known product has had to conduct litigation running over a period of years to protect himself from unfair competition. Baker's chocolate, Rogers' Silverware, Knabe Pianos, and
many other equally famous brands of goods have been the subjects
2
The relief afforded the plaintiff has not
of suit again and again.
always been adequate. The history of the controversy which has
raged over the Waterman fountain pen is enlightening.
Before beginning the discussion, it would be well for the
reader to ask himself if he knows who the maker of this product is.
Can he distinguish between a pen made by the L. E. Waterman
Company and one bearing the name of A. A. Waterman & Co.?
It seems not unreasonable to say that ninety-nine out of a hundred
individuals would be.unable to state which was the original Waterman pen.
In brief, the story is this. -The pen was originally made by
Lewis E. Waterman, and later by the L. E. Waterman Company,
by whom Arthur A. Waterman was employed. In 1898, he left
them, and went into partnership with one Gibson, under the name of
"A. A. Waterman Pen Company." An injunction was secured
"Act of March 3, 188I, c. 138; 21 Sat. 502.
Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, supra, note 14.
Act of February 20, 1905, c. 592; 33 Stat. 725.
Act of March 19, 1920; 41 Stat. 533.
U. S. 461
Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Manufacturing Co., 233
(1914).

"Warner Bros. Co. v. Wiener, 218 Fed. 635, 134 C. C..A. 393 (1914),
modifying 2r4 Fed. 3o, i3o C. C. A. 424.

(1918),
" Stark Bros. Nurseries & Orchard Co. v. Stark, 248 Fed. 154
(1921).
5o
S.
U.
255
affirmed
(1939),
221
A.
C.
C.
i68
9,
Fed.
modified 257
"See note 12, supra.
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against him in the Supreme Court, New York County, 33 restraining
the use of the name "Waterman" in connection with the word
"Pen," but permitting a statement that the pens were made by A. A.
Waterman & Co. or Arthur A. Waterman & Co. From that time
on Arthur A. Waterman engaged in various enterprises in connection with fountain pens, all of which were unsuccessful. In
19o5, he and two men named Chapman formed a partnership known
as "A. A. Waterman & Co." The agreement provided that the
partnership should have the right to use Waterman's name, but that
his interest in the firm should cease in i9o6. A corporation known
as the "Modern Pen Co." was to be created, to act as sole selling
-agent for pens manufactured by A. A. Witerman & Co. Arthur A.
Waterman's only real connection with either firm seerfis to have
been as salesman for the Modern Pen Company.
Suit was brought by the L. E. Waterman Company, and a preliminary injunction issued forbidding the Modem Pen Company
from using the name "A. A. Waterman & Co." in the sale of pens.
This was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,' on the ground
that Arthur A. Waterman had the right to use that name in a business in which he was a partner, and to transfer that right to his
former associates in connection with a reorganization of the business. Another action was brought, and an injunction secured, forbidding the Modern Pen Company to use the name "A. A. Waterman & Co." except in connection with the phrase "not connected
with the original Waterman pens." 3 On appeal to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, this was modified to read "not connected with the
L. E. Waterman Co.," because, in the opinion of the court, the first
decree tended to characterize the defendant's product as inferior to
that of the complainant.'
Both parties 3 7 appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States, which, with one justice dissenting,"8
affirmed the decree as modified 3
Mr. Justice Holmes, in delivering
the opinion, took the position that Arthur A. Waterman had an
interest in the defendant's business; and that therefore the situation
Unreported. The case was never appealed.
"L R. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 183 Fed. in8, ioS C. C. A.
408

(191o).

xI93 Fed. 242 (D. C. 1912).
Fed. 534, 17 C. C. A. 3o.(1912).
"Meanwhile, the L. E. Waterman.Co. was proceeding against dealers'
in A. A. Waterman pens elsewhere. See L. E. Waterman Co. v. Standard
"197

Drug Co., 2o2 Fed. I67, i20 C. C. A. 455 '(193).

'Mr, Justice Pitney. "The partnership ageement-appears upon its
face to, be a mere sham and a fraudulent device, and is demonstrated to
be such by the other evidence. The case presents no question respecting the
right of an individual to the bona fidc use of his name. I think the Modern
Pen Company should'be un.qualifiedly enjoined from using the name 'Waterman.'

"235 U. S. 88 (x94).
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was as though he were operating alone under his own name. He
held that, even though the defendant's motive was to get an advantage from the use of the name "Waterman," the decree gave
the plaintiff all the protection to which he was entitled.41
The remedy granted by the Federal courts proved inadequate to
prevent confusion. The L. E. Waterman Company turned to the
various states. Iii New York, it was about to commence action
against the Cbapmans, the makers of A. A. Waterman pens, when
they took the initiative by obtaining an injunction against the bringing of suit. The L. E. Waterman Company's counterclaim, asking
for an injunction against the making and selling of pens othei than
theirs under the name "Waterman," and for damages, was dismissed.
On appeal, this was reversed." The court held that the decree in
the Modern Pen Case was not i'es adjudicata, because the parties
were not the same; that the plaintiffs were not privies to the firm
composed of Arthur A. Waterman and Edward L. Gibson, and
hence were not permitted to use the name allowed by the decree of
the court in i898; that the agreement of partnership with Arthur
A. Waterman was a mere sham and a fraudulent device; and that
the defendant should have judgment.
Another decision which differs-from that of the United States
Supreme Court was rendered by the Appellate Court of Illinois during the past year. 42 The L. E. Waterman Company sued A. A.
Waterman & Co., Inc., an Arizona corporation in which Arthur A.
Waterman had at one time possessed a nominal interest, and to
which he had granted the right to use his name. The lower court
granted a decree similar to that issued in the Modern Pen Case.
The upper court held that this failed to give the complainant any
relief of value, and enjoined the defendant from using the name
"Waterman" "either alone, or in any combination, or with any prefixes or suffixes." Mr. Justice Dever pointed out that the Federal
courts had found as a fact that Arthur A. Waterman retained some
pecuniary interest in the Modern Pen Company, 3 whereas in the
instant case the master had found that his connection with A. A.
Waterman & Co., Inc., had long ago ceased, and had never been
more than nominal.
This review of the controversy which has been going on in the
courts since 1898 shows the unfortunate effect which the common
law principle of absolute right to the use of one's name has had in
For a criticism of this decision, see John H. Wigmore. "Justice, Commercial Morality, and the Federal Supreme Court; The Waterman Pen
Case." io ILL. L. REv. 17&.
"Chapman v. L. E. Waterman Co.,, 176 ApVI. Div. 697, 53 N. Y. S.
1O59 (1917).
a L E. Waterman Co. v. A.-A.Waterman & Co., Inc, 13 Trade Mark
App. 1923).
Reporter 74 (Ill.
a

But see the dissenting opinion, note 38, supra.
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practice. At the time when it was first laid down, it was probably a
very just rule. The ever-increasing complexity of modern cornmerce has made modification desirable. Greater protection should
be afforded the maker of a product who has spent large *sums in
advertising it throughout the world and in establishing a valuable
good-will. More important, however, is the right of the public to
receive what it intends to purchase, and not to be misled into taking
some inferior imitation. It is time for the law to recognize that
the average buyer, whatever he should be in theory, is in fact extremely unwary. The great body of consumers must be safeguarded, even at the expense of abridging the abstract right of
the newcomer in business. It is not too much to say that at some
future time the courts will lay down the rule that if a man cannot
use his rtame, even with an explanatory phrase, without creating
confusion, he must abstain from its use in business altogether.
C. if. F.
STATUS OF BANKRUPT'S PROPERTY BETWEEN FILING OF PETI-

ADJUDICATION.-To what extent one may in good faith
discharge his obligation to a bankrupt during the pendency of the
bankruptcy proceedings, is a question not very clearly settled. One
court has candidly stated that "there is conflict in the conclusions
reached in the few cases dealing with this question." " However,
Justice Schaffer, in a learned opinioii in'the recent Pennsylvania
2
Supreme Court case of Stow v. Superior Insurance Co., suggests
that most of the supposedly conflicting views on the subject may be
reconciled? It is the purpose'of this note to show that such reconciliation is entirely possible.
The case of Stone v. Insurance Co.,' being a typical case on the
subject, can well serve as an introduction to the exact problem involved. In that case, one Gioffre owned a store, which he had insured with the defendant company. The building was destroyed by
fire, and two months thereafter Gioffre made proof of loss. A few
weeks later, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against
Gioffre. Subsequently the insurance company, without actual notice
of the filing of this petition, paid to Gioffre the fbll amount of the
policy, less the amount of a mortgage. Thereiijon Gioffre absconded with the proceeds. Soon. thereaffer- he was adjudicated a
bankrupt," and a trustee was appointed: The trustee brought suit onm
the policy, ana it was held that the trtqstee could not recover.
TION AND

' Per Lamar, I., in Johnson v. Collier, 222 U. S. 538 (1912).
'No. 5, Oct. Term, x923, decided January, 1924.
'Schaffer, J., speaking of the cases, says that a "careful perusal, having

in mind the particular- facts of each case, will dispel at least some of the
fog."

'Supra in note 2.

308

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

This decision no doubt has authority to support it. To determine the validity of this authority, it will be well to examine the
reasoning upon which it rests. The bankrupt is regarded as having title to an intangible piece of personal property, namely, a chose
in action" which results from the loss occurring under the policy.
The status of this property is to be determined under the Federal
Bankruptcy Act of 1898' . By force of this act, the property is said
to pass to the trustee as of the date of adjudication. The payment
by the insurance company destroyed the chose in action," so that
no title was left to vest in the trustee at that time. The trustee,
having no title to the chose in action, cannot recover.
There is ho doubt concerning the first step in this reasoning.
That a chose in action is transferable property is recognized beyond
doubt. However, the question of when this property passes to the
trustee is so crucial as to deserve minute consideration. Itis upon
this point that the supposed conflict exists.
To start at the beginning, we must examine the Act of 1898.0
This provides that "the trustee . . . shall be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of adjudication, to all . . . property which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred." 10 A chose in action
being a piece of property which the bankrupt could have transferred
by assignment prior to the date of filing of the petition, the conclusion seems inevitable that the trustee is vested with title thereto "as
of the date of adjudication." " That is, the trustee takes the title
which the bankrupt had at the date of adjudication. No case has
been found which reaches any other conclusion under the positive
statement thus contained in this part of the act.
The cases which are supposed to conflict on this point were
not originally based on diny express provision of the act. In general, the supposition is that these are authorities for the proposition
that, from the date of the petition, the bankrupt has lost all right to
'Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474 (1913); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228
U. S. 479 0913) ; Frederick v. Mutual Insurance Co., 256 U. S. 395 (192!).
'Similarly, in In re Zotti, i08 C. C. A. i96; 186 Fed. 84 (1911), where,
after filing of petition, a bank had, without notice of the proceedings, paid
the bankrupt's checks, and the trustee later sued, he was not permitted to
recover, the court proceeding on this same reasoning, and saying that "the
indebtedness of the bank to Zotti was property which he could have transferred."
'Act of July i, I898, c. 541, 30 Stat. L. 544.
'As stited by Schaffer, I.,"upon payrrient, the right of action ceased to
exist."
Supra in note 7.
"*
Section 70, subsection a (5).
';Cf. quotation, from In re Zotti, supra in note 6. See alsu Andrews
v. Partridge, 228 U. S.479 (x93).
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deal with his property. This, in effect, would be saying that he had
lost title. If, indeed, these cases were decisions on this point, they
would be authorities against Stone v. Insurance Co." However, a
close examination will reveal that any conflict is merely in dicta.
The contrary view started with a statement in the case of

..
Alueller v. Nugent,2" that "the filing of the petition is a caveat to all

the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction." It is not
unnatural to infer from this statement that the court meant that
nobody could deal with the bankrupt after the filing of the petition."
thus, the statement is contrary in effect to Stone v. Insurance
Taken
2
Co.,

5

but also, if the statement be taken thus, it was unnecessary

to the decision. The sole question in Mueler v. Nugent 11 was
whether one who knew of the insolvency of a bankrupt could be
compelled by the court to give up the bankrupt's property before
adjudication. The decision was merely that the court had sufficient
jurisdiction over all the bankrupt's property from the time of the
petition, so that it could compel the agent to surrender the property.
The case did not go so far as to decide that- title passed out of the
bankrupt when the court acquired this control.
This dictum was taken up in the case of Acme Harvester Co. v.
Beckman.2" In that case, after a petition had been filed, one creditor got an attachment against the bankrupt, in pursuance of which
a state court held that enough property could be taken from the.
bankrupt to satisfy the judgment, on the ground that the Act of
)898
provided that all property should remain in the bankrupt until.
adjudication. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed
this decision and held that the attachment of the lone creditor, acquired after the date of the petition, could not be satisfied until the
prior liens of all the other creditors, acquired by virtue of the petition, had been satisfied. To uphold the point *that the creditors
obtained a lien on all the bankrupt's property from the date of the
petition, the court quotes Mueller v.. Nugent for the proposition
acts as an attachment.
that
. Ittheis petition
readily seen that this did not decide that legal title passed
out of the bankrupt at the moment of the petition; indeed, it decided
quite flatly that it remained in the bankrupt, subject to an attachment in favor of all creditors: The unfortunate part of the decision
is that it had to reverse a.lower court which .had relied on the rule
that title remained in the bankrupt until adjudication; and had to.
" Supra in note 2.
3 184 U. S. x (x9o2).
" In i Fed. Stat. Ann. (2d ed.) x55, this conclusion is drawn. See also
In re Mertens, 131 Fed. 5o7 (i9o4).
3 Supra in note 2.
"Supra in note i3.
"222 U. S. 300 (91).
"Supra in note 13.
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substitute therefor the dictum of Mueller v. Nugent." Hence,
although the case in no way overruled the rule relied on in the
lower court, but merely decided that that rule was not applicable,
the fact remains that it gave the appearance of rejecting the rule,
and of adopting that of Mueller v. Nugent.
When, in i91o, the act was amended to read that the trustees
"as to all property in the custody or coming into the custody of the
bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings thereon," 20 this likewise seemed to be express approval
of the rule developed from Mueller v. Ntfgent. This appearance is
no doubt accountable in some measure for the belief that this amendment was meant to change the earlier provision for retention of
title; and that a case such as Stone v. Insurance Co., which still
holds that legal title remains in the bankrupt, is not only in conflict
with Acme Co. v. Beeknman,2 ' but also with the provisions of this
amendment.
However, it can easily be seen that the conflict is only apparent; 22 for, while the original act and Stone v. Insurance Co. stand
for the proposition that legal title does not pass out of the bankrupt
until adjudication, the amendment and. Acme Co. v. Beckman admit
this, and merely add that, while the itle thus remains in the bankrupt, it is subject to a lien in favor of all creditors. Therefore, the
cases are in accord on the primary question as to who has title during pendency of the proceedings.
Still, this does not entirely reconcile the cases. If the bankrupt
is to be regarded as holding title subject to an incumbrance, it
seems a logical deduction that, although he can pass his title to a
bona fide purchaser for value, he cannot thereby defeat the incumbrance. It is therefore difficult to see how in theory the bankrupt
in Stone v. Insurance Co., by giving up his right to the chose in action, defeated the lien which the creditors, represented by the trustee,
had already acquired. The explanation advanced by the court
in that case was that "if there was nothing in existence at the time
of the adjudication to which he (the trustee) could take title, it is
immaterial in what condition any property might have been at the
date of the filing of the petition." Since a valid lien existing prior
to the sale would be far from immaterial, it seems that the court by
this statement denied the existence of the lien for the purpose of its
decision.
However, the court did not entirely deny the rule of Acmw Co.
v. Beckman. Rather, it changed its theory. Instead of the credi-

" Supra in note 13.

" Act of June 25, 1910, C. 412, 36 Stat. L. 838, section 8.
= Supra in note 17.
"That these cases are on different questions is recognized in York v.
Cassell, 2si U. S. 344 (I9o6).

NOTES
tors being regarded as holders of a lien, they are in terms made
ccsluis que trustent, with the bankrupt occupying the position of a
trustee as to all the property which was his before the bankruptcy
petition. As such, he is subject to all the principles of the law of
trusts. He may dispose of the trust property, and if the person
acquiring it be a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration,
the beneficiaries cannot recover it."
This explanation of the right which the creditors have from
the date of the petition, has some sanction from one provision of
the Act of 1898, which provides that "such property (transferred
by bankrupt during proceedings) may be recovered -from whoever
2
, This
may have received it, except a bona fide holder for value."
25
in substance gives the bankrupt the powers of a trustee in dealing with the trust res, as mentioned above.
It has thus been seen that, although the cases agree that title
is retained until adjudication, they seem to be at loggerheads concerning the nature of the right which the creditors or the trustee
acquire upon the filing of the petition. Does this mean that finally
the authorities are irreconcilable? An examination of the facts of
the cases shows that they are not. It will be found that whenever
a decision is rested on the rule of Acme Co. v.Beekman, the question is between the trustee in bankruptcy and one who has endeav-7
ored to perfect a lien under an attachment," mortgage, or condi28
tional sale, after the filing of the petition, the obligation having
arisen previously. The lien theory then protects the trustee. On
the other hand, when a case is based on the rule of Stone v. Insurance Co., the question is always between the trustee and one who has
Hence,
paid value for property without notice of the proceedings"
there is not necessarily a conflict-the lien theory is used unless the
trist theory is needed to protect a bona fide purchaser for value.
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that the cases are
in substantial accord on three fundamental points: first, the legal
title to all property remains in the bankrupt until adjudication;
second, the creditors have a lien from the date of the petition, so as
to be protected against subsequent attachments; third, the bankrupt
can pass good title to any piece of property to a bona fide purchaser
=This theory is also advanced in Shawnee County v. Hurley, 94 C. C.
A. 362; i69 Fed. 92 (i9og), and in Gunther y. Home Insurance Co., 236
Fed. 396 (1923).
"Secion 7o (e).
3'Cf. Bogert, Trusts (ist ed. 1921), 3o5, 5o8.
"Bank v. Cox, 74 C. C. A. 285, 143 Fed. 91 (1906).
"In re Pekin Plow Co., So'C. C. A. 257, r12 Fed. 308 (igoi).
"In re Garcewich, 53 C. C. A. 5io, Iis Fed. 87 (i902); Chesapeake Shoe
Co. v. Deldner, 58 C. C. A. 261, i22 Fed. 593 (1903); Bailey v. Baker Ice
Machine Co., 239 U.-S. 268 (1915)'"
21In re Zotti, supra in note 6; Frederick v.-Insurance Co., supra in note S.
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for value. On these three principles, the right of one who in good
faith deals with a bankrupt during pendency of the proceedings
can be ascertained without confusion.
Al. E. G.
LIABILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY

EFFECTS

OF

NEGLIGENT DEFENDANT FOR THE

AN Acr OF GOD.-In a case recently decided by the

Kentucky Court of Appeals a carrier was held not liable for injury
to goods in transit caused by a fire, concerning which no fault
was attributable to the defendant, where it was shown that had it
not been for a negligent delay in shipping, by the defendant, the
goods would have escaped injury.1
This decision is interesting in that it presented to the court a
choice between two diametrically opposite views as to the liability
of a carrier for injury to goods entrusted to it for carriage, caused
by an act of God or other forces, over which it had no control, to
which the goods are exposed
by reason of a delay due to the negli2
gence of the carrier.
The court, exercising Federal jurisdiction, adopted the view
expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Railroad v.
Rccvcs, and held the carrier not liable, rejecting the view taken by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Cure. Pipe Line Co. v. Stainbaugh etc.,- under which the carrier would have been liable.
There is no point upon which there is a more decided and
even split of authority than upon this question. The cases which
deny liability are put upon the ground that the force which injures
the goods is an intervening force for which the defendant is not
responsible and which, therefore, breaks the chaih of causation and'
is itself the legally proximate cause of the injury.5
'Kessler & Co. v. South. Ry. Co. in Kentucky 255 S. W. 535 (923).
'The authorities are collected and discussed in Green-Wheeler Shoe Co.
v. Chic., Rock Island and Pac. Ry. Co., i3o Iowa 123, io6 N. W. 498 (19o6),
and also in Rogers v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 75 Kans. r2a2 88 Pac. 885 (907).
In the former case the defendant was held liable for goods destroyed by
a flood so great and unusual as to be an act of God where, if it had not

been for the delay caused by the defendant's negligence, the goods would

.have been uninjured; whereas in the latter the opposite view was taken.
3 77 U. S. (Io Wall.) 176 (1870).
' 137 Ky. 528, 126 S. W. 106 (igo). In this case the defendant negligently obstructed a stream down which the plaintiff was floating logs, thereby
delaying their progress to such extent as to cause them to be overtaken by

a flood which, but for the delay, would not have affected them.
'Morrison v. Davis & Co., 2o Pa. 171 (1852); Hoadley v. Northern
Trans. Co., 115 Mass. 3o7 (1874); Denny v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co, 79
Mass. (13 Gray) 482 (1859); St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Comm. Union
Ins. Co., 139 U. S. 237 (1891); R. R. Co. v. Reeves (supra in note 3);
also see io C. J. 127, and cases cited thereunder.

NOTES .

The reasons for holding the carrier liable are so admirably
stated by the late Professor Jeremiah Smith that it is difficult to
add anything thereto.6 His view is substantially this: a loss has
occurred; some one must bear it. The shipper is innocent of all
fault; the defendant is negligent. As between the two, therefore,
the negligent defendant should bear the loss unless some firmly
established legal principle precludes recovery. The only principle
suggested to relieve the carrier from liability would be that even a
negligent wrongdoer is answerable only for those consequences
which, as a reasonable man, he should have foreseen.7 Professor
Smith's discussion of this question is contained in an appendix to a
series of articles, in wh3ch he has shown that the trend of authority
is that it is not necessary that a negligent defendant should have
anticipated the precise harm or the precise manner .in- which it
occurs so long as the harm results as a natural consequence of the
negligence.'
On the other hand, Professor Joseph H. Beale attempts to
reduce the principles of legal causation to definite rules. He disbetween what he calls an "active" force and a
tinguishes sharply
"passive" force.9 The defendant's conduct remains "active" so long
as any force is operating which itself is set in motion by the defendant's conduct. An act done by a human being, himself sui juris,
even though done deliberately, continues the activity of the force
originating in the wrongdoing, if such act is a reaction to the stimulus of a situation created by the wrongY' A "passive" force, as he
sees it, is what is usually described as a situation created by thi
defendant's act which is in itself and by itself incapable of doing
harm, but which contains the potentiality of harm if some act of
another brings him into contact with it or if some outside force so
acts upon it as to make it dangerous, so, in a sense, utilizing it to
cause the harm of which the plaintiff complains.21
According to Professor Beale, where the force is "active," the
wrongdoer remains answerable irrespective of whether he should
'25

HARv. L

Rav.

321-324.

'This rule is sustained by Pollock, Torts (8th ed. 19o8)

32;

Cooley,

Torts (2 ed. i888) 74, note i; and Salmond, Torts (2d ed. 19o7) io9.
'25

HARV. L. REV. x23-i27.

' 33 1IARv. L REay. 641.
"1Id. 646-648 and examples.
"Id. 643--"The connection of the defendant with the final active force
may be sought in two ways. His connection with it may have been an.

active one . . . On the other hand the defendanf may have acted, and
the force thereby loosed may have spent itself, coming to equilibrium in
the form of a condition of forces which may or may not
then, this condition is unstable, if it is in appreciable danger
upon by an oncoming force, the defendant who thus created
the path of an oncoming force, stands in a certain casual

be stable. If,
of being acted
a condition in
relation to the

latter force though the relation is worked out through the passive line . . ."
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have foreseen he manner in which his conduct would operate to
create these new assisting forces.' 2 Where the force is "passive"and here it may be suggested that it is difficult to see how anything
passive can be a force-Professor Beale's position is that the originator of the "passive" force is answerable only if he should have
foreseen that the new force-the act of the plaintiff which brings
him in contact with it or the outside force which utilizes it-would
operate to give a new activity to it.13
In the instant case 1 4 the delay would, under Professor Beale's
theory, create a merely "passive" force, and the carrier would not
be liable for the injury to the goods carried by him unless the circumstances of the case were such as to make it apparent to the
carrier that the delay would expose the goods to the risk of injury
from the very force which injured them. Unfortunately the decided
cases upon proximate causation are not capable of any such rigid
classification.'"
All of the cases like the one under consideration have been
cases where the plaintiff has been a bailor, and the defendant a
bailee, of goods; the majority, where the defendant has been a
common carrier. It would seem, therefore, that the carrier, being
obliged to deliver the goods unless their loss was caused by an act of
God, the King's enemies, or ws major, should not be permitted to
excuse their noit-delivery, unless he can show that the loss was.
caused solely by such superior force and that no misconduct by him
as bailee was in any way a contributing cause of the loss.1 6
The cases are substantially unanimous in holding, in support of
this theory, that a carrier is liable for injury to or loss of goods,
from any cause whatsoever during a deviati6n from the agreed
route. "' In principle there seems to be no distinction between a
deviation which brings the goods within the field of the operation of
the extraordinary force which, injures them, and a delay which
S1 Id.644.

12Md. 651-657"Kessler & Co. v. South. Ry. Co. (supra note 3).
'See 25 H.Av. L. REV. 123-127.
"See

Smith in 25 HARV. L. Ray. 324-"If the defendant is a common

carrier, the argument against him is still stronger. Such a defendant, in
setting up the plea that the damage was due to the act of God, is claiming the benefit of an exception to the stringent general rule as tb a common carrier's liability. But the benefit of this exception should be allowid
-only to those common carriers who are personally free from fault. It ought
not to be allowed where the carrier's tortious delay exposed plaintiff's property to destruction by an extraordinary departure from the usual course of
nature."
'TDavis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716, 130 Eng. Rep. 1456 (i83o); Crosby v.
Fitch, T2 Conn. 410 (i83o); Hand v. Baynes, 4 Whart. (Pa.) 204; Mer-

chant's Despatch Trans. Co. v. Kahn, 76 Ill.
(3d ed. xgo6), vol. x, p. 3o8.

52o

(1875); Hutch., Carriers

NOTES
causes the same effect. In these cases,"8 the. deviation, it is true,
was wilful, but whether the deviation be wilful or negligent cannot
affect the proximity of causation. And although it has been suggested that the cases of wilful deviation may be explained on the
ground that such a deviation is a conversion, 9 apart from the very
grave doubt as to whether such a departure from the terms of the
bailment would be2 a conversion, none of the cases has treated the
deviation as such.
Where the deviation of a vessel deprives the carrier of the
benefit of insurance which he had effected for the particular voyage, there may appear to be a sort of rough justice in requiring that
the carrier, whose negligence has frustrated the consignor's precautions, should himself become insurer of the safety of the goods,
but that this is not essential appears from the fact that Davis v.
Garrett, in which these facts appear, was cited by the English
Court of Appeals as authority for holding a bookbinder, who had
negligently delayed the delivery of books entrusted to him for binding, answerable to their owner for their destruction during the delay
by fire for which he was in no way responsible.2- '
It may be pertinent to call attention to cases where the defendant was under no such stringent duty as that which the common law
imposed upon a bailee, but where, none the less, there is a strong
and prevailing opinion that even the act of God, in its strictest sense
of a force of nature so unusual and abnormal that the expense of
guarding against it would be out of proportion to the danger which
it threatens, does not relieve a negligent defendant from liability for
that harm which is due entirely to the act of God.22
If the defendant constructs a culvert so negligently that it is
insufficient to carry off th6 water normally to be expected, he is
liable not only for the damage done by the backing up of the normal
water, but also for the damage done by the backing up of the altogether unexpectable volume of water caused by an unprecedented
storm or cloudburst, though he was not bound to anticipate in advance such a cloudburst or make the culvert adequate to carry off
the abnormal rainfall.2 3 The question of legal proximity is as much
involved where a negligent defendant is required to pay for damage
in excess of that which he should have recognized as likely to be
caused by his conduct, as where the unexpectable damage is the
sole injury of which the plaintiff complains. If an act of God does
not so break the chain of causation as to relieve a negligent defend-

"Note 17 supra.
"Dobie, Balimdnts & Carriers, 358.
' See Note 17 su pra.
Shaw & Co. v. Smythington & Sons, L. R. K. B. 799 (1917).
:'See Professor- Bohlen's Cases on Torts, vol. i, p. 261, note
"Rife v. Middleton, 32 Pa. Super. 68 (19o6);

2.
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ant from liability for the excess damage caused by it, it should not
relieve him from liability where the only damage which the plaintiff
suffers is so caused.
There is one possible explanation, though a very intricate one,
which would sustain the decision in the instant case. Henry T.
Terry, in his book on "Anglo-American Law," distinguishes between
the various intf.rests protected Ly law and intimates that the law protects these various interests rather than the general interests of the
plaintiff.24 He would probably call the destruction of the goods an
invasion of the shipper's interest in the unimpaired physical condition of his property. He might call the harm done to the shipper by
mpere delay, which, after all, merely prevents him from taking advantage of a favorable market or of using the goods to his economic
advantage during the period of delay, an invasion of his right to
unimpaired economic condition.2
If it is permissible so to segregate the various interests of the
shipper, it might be said that the defendant's negligent act threatened injury only to a right of pecuniary condition, and that the injury was done to a different right-the plaintiff's right in the unimpaired condition of his property-and thus there was absent that
'correspondence" between the right invaded and the right imperiled which Professor Terry regards as necessary to an action on the
case for negligence. 26 This would be an extension of the strongly
prevailing view that an act which is negligent towards A as threatening an undue probability of harm to his interests, followed by an
injury to B as to whom the act was not wrongful, cannot be joined
to make a perfect right of action in either.27
C.E.K.
"Terry, Anglo-American Law (1884).
Id. 46r-465, 542-546.
"Id. 546--'The duty and the right must also correspond in specie; that
is, the right violated must not only be a right of the kind to which the
duty broken may correspond but it must be the very specific right to which
in the particular case it does correspond."

"Id. 548, 549.

